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BABETTE BOLIEK* 
INTRODUCTION 
 This essay discusses the Federal Communication Commission’s 
(the “FCC”) recent factual record supporting and exercising authority 
in the Open Internet Order1 and urges that reviewing courts take a 
close, and perhaps even a skeptical, look at the Commission’s 
findings.2 Although much political excitement has been elicited by the 
recent Open Internet Order, the agency’s rulemaking process is 
designed to be, at least partially insulated from the political process.  
Administrative agency rulemakings are to be based not primarily on 
political judgments, but rather on technical expertise.  An expert 
agency, such as the FCC, is tasked to delve deeply into engineering, 
economics, and other fields implicated by its rulemaking and to 
defend itself based on the record of its technical findings. 
* Associate Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law, J.D. Columbia
University School of Law, Ph.D. Economics University of California, Davis.  The author 
would like to thank the participants and organizers of the Future of Internet Regulation, 
panel at The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law, March 2015 for their helpful 
comments.  A special thanks goes to Professor Peter Shane for his helpful insight and his 
rich knowledge of Administrative Law.  The author is grateful also for the thorough and 
able research assistance of Scott Morrison. 
1 Section 706 appears in an un-codified section of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, titled, 
“Miscellaneous Provisions.”  47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012) (Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act 
(BDIA), Pub. L. No. 110-385, 122 Stat. 4096 (2008), codified in Title 47, Chapter 12 of the 
U.S. Code.  It is commonly referred to as “Section 706.”). 
2 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC, passim (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://www.fcc.gov/openinternet (follow “Open Internet Order” button; then download 
the document) [hereinafter the “Open Internet Order” or the “Order”].  
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 It is the very nature of this technical rulemaking process that 
makes judicial review of agency decisions rather difficult.  Legal 
precedent dictates that a court cannot substitute its own judgment for 
that of the agency—it is a matter of judicial deference to the agency’s 
congressionally-designated expertise.3  Nor is a court permitted to 
place any additional procedural requirements on agency rulemaking 
beyond those imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act, agency-
specific statutes, or an agency’s own regulations. Even though its 
findings are given a great deal of deference, an agency is not permitted 
to make decisions that are “arbitrary and capricious” under the law.4  
Unless the court is vigilant in the review of the technical record—
insistent that the record meet certain minimum standards—the 
prohibition on arbitrary and capricious  decision-making has little 
meaning. 
 That brings me to the Open Internet Order.  Due to many flaws, 
vagaries, and questionable factual determinations, I believe the Order 
is vulnerable to an “arbitrary and capricious” challenge based on the 
underlying record.  To fully substantiate such a conclusion, however, 
is beyond the scope of this essay.  Instead, in this essay, I will focus on 
a small part of the Open Internet Order—the exercise of section 706 
jurisdiction—to examine the ideal role of a reviewing court.  In 
particular, I suggest that when a plaintiff can establish a prima facie 
case that the agency has ignored substantial issues or 
mischaracterized the evidence, a reviewing court should move from a 
deferential to a skeptical review of the agency’s evidentiary record.  In 
other words, even an expert agency should be forced to take on the 
burden of persuasion once a challenger shows the agency has played 
 
 
 
 
3 To the extent the organic statute is found ambiguous, the FCC will arguably benefit from 
the Chevron deference, given to agencies in the interpretation of their own statute, even if 
the ambiguity implicates the agency’s own jurisdictional boundaries.  See Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); id. at 843 n.11 (holding 
that courts will defer to an agency’s interpretation of an organic statute if the statute is 
ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is permissible); see also City of Arlington, Tex. 
v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013).  Roughly speaking, courts give agencies Chevron 
deference if the agency’s statutory conclusions and resulting rulemakings are rational and 
not arbitrary and capricious.  Such deference makes it difficult for a private plaintiff to 
challenge the decision-making process of an agency.  
4 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983); see also CBS Corp. v. FCC, 663 F.3d 122, 152 (3rd Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
Commission’s changed policy was not supported by a “reasoned explanation” and is, 
therefore, arbitrary and capricious. Thus, CBS’s petition was granted review and the 
Commission’s order was vacated in its entirety.).  
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fast and loose with findings that are material or, at least, significant to 
its decision making. 
 As mentioned above, to demonstrate the need for skeptical review, 
this essay sets forth a brief examination of the FCC’s section 706 
evidentiary record.  Part I is a quick primer on FCC Internet 
jurisdiction from Title I (light-touch regulation) to the current section 
706 regulation.  In Part II, this essay looks at the two key phases of the 
section 706 evidentiary record: (a) the link between section 706 
jurisdiction and the so called “section 706” reports and (b) the 
evidence provided or ignored to support the exercise of section 706 
jurisdiction in the Open Internet Order.  Again, because space is 
limited, rather than fully describe all of the Order’s potential 
shortcomings, this essay concentrates on a few red flags that may 
indicate the need for a skeptical, rather than deferential, review of the 
record.     
I. FCC INTERNET JURISDICTION 
 Internet access had been classified as a Title I information service 
for twenty years.5  The FCC, based on express Congressional approval, 
formalized this regulatory classification in separate rulemakings for 
the various technologies that provide Internet access (wire telephony, 
wireless, cable, and satellite).6  Each technology is separately 
regulated in the 1934 Communications Act, and such separate 
treatment was deemed necessary to provide clarity to all industry 
operators.   
 Section 706 was not part of the jurisdictional calculus.  Indeed, the 
FCC determined that this “Miscellaneous Provision[]” of the 1996 
5 Some of the following discussion is an update to analyses previously presented. See 
Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality is Defining the 
Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627 (2011). 
6 High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 
4802 ¶ 7 (2002) (deciding that cable broadband services are neither Title II 
“telecommunications services” nor Title VI “cable services”); Appropriate Framework for 
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, FCC No. 02-33 at 47 (2005) 
(classifying wired telephony broadband access as an information service); Appropriate 
Reg. Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireless Networks, FCC 07-30, 
WT Dkt. No 07-53, at 19 (2007) (wireless broadband access classified as an “information 
service”). 
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Telecommunications Act added no authority, but, instead, was only a 
reporting requirement. 7  The essential test of 706 is as follows: 
(a) IN GENERAL—The Commission and each State 
commission with regulatory jurisdiction over 
telecommunications services shall encourage the 
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of 
advanced telecommunications capability to all 
Americans . . . by utilizing, in a manner consistent with 
the public interest, convenience and necessity, price 
cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that 
promote competition in the local telecommunications 
market, or other regulating methods that remove 
barriers to infrastructure investment. 
(b) INQUIRY . . . .[T]he Commission [shall initiate a notice 
of inquiry to] determine whether advanced 
telecommunications capability is being deployed to all 
Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.  If the 
Commission’s determination is negative, it shall take 
immediate action to accelerate deployment of such 
capability by removing barriers to infrastructure 
investment and by promoting competition in the 
telecommunications market. 8 
 The FCC’s move to utilize section 706 as a separate basis for 
independent jurisdiction first began when the D.C. Circuit found that 
Title I did not empower the FCC to impose certain open Internet or 
net neutrality principles on Comcast—namely (i) transparency and (ii) 
no blocking.9  In Comcast, the FCC did raise the potential of section 
7 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13 
FCC Rcd. 24012, 24044 ¶ 69 (1998) (“[S]ection 706(a) does not constitute an independent 
grant of forbearance authority or of authority to employ other regulating methods.”) 
(emphasis added).  
8 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012). 
9 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 659 (2010) (declining to extend Section 706 to 
enforce Formal Comp. of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028 (2008)). 
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706 to provide the requisite authority, but the argument did not play a 
part in the court’s final decision.10   
 The uniqueness of the section 706 evidentiary record is that it can 
be broken down into two phases: The first establishes the FCC’s 
jurisdictional reach; and the second provides the FCC support for the 
operational tools it utilizes in the Open Internet Order.  In other 
words, to the extent the FCC’s desired outcome is to implement the 
open Internet rules that were struck down largely on jurisdictional 
grounds by two courts, the FCC laid the evidentiary groundwork early 
to legitimize its jurisdictional reach in the most recent Open Internet 
Order.  Undeterred, the FCC continued to propose support for section 
706 jurisdiction for open Internet rules.  This change in the FCC’s own 
legal interpretation of section 706 was given a nod of judicial approval 
in Verizon v. FCC.11   
 The court noted, however, that section 706 jurisdiction is tricky.12 
For example, section 706(b) is a slippery jurisdictional launching pad 
because it has an “on-off” switch that can be flipped by the factual 
record.13  This means that the factual record of the section 706 report 
may be highly significant to FCC rulemaking powers to the extent it 
turns “on” section 706(b) jurisdiction.  
 Arguably, section 706(a) may be found to give independent 
authority, which creates its own unique problems, and no section 
10 Id.  
11 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 636-37 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The factual record that 
established the conclusion of the court is, itself, slim.   
12 For example, the Verizon court noted that it “might well hesitate to conclude that 
Congress intended to grant the Commission substantive authority in section 706(a) if that 
authority would have no limiting principle.”  Id. at 639.   
13 The “on-off” switch is a metaphor for the FCC’s section 706 authority. See Verizon, supra 
note 11, at 635 (if the Commission finds that advanced telecommunications capability is 
not being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion, then section 706 
allows the FCC to “take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by 
removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the 
telecommunications market,” effectively turning their regulatory authority “on.”). Verizon 
argued that the FCC’s determination in the Sixth Broadband Deployment Report—which 
turned their regulatory authority “on”—was essentially the result of factual manipulation, 
and the Verizon court acknowledged that the timing of the FCC’s determination was 
“certainly suspicious.” Id. at 642. Justice Silberman expressed concern that “unwarranted 
government interference in a functioning market” (the “on” period) would be “likely to 
persist indefinitely, whereas a failure to intervene, even when regulation would be helpful, 
is likely to be only temporarily harmful because new innovations are constantly 
undermining entrenched industrial powers.” Id. at 667 (Silberman, J., dissenting). 
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706(b) “on switch” will be necessary for its use.  For purposes of this 
essay, however, I will examine section 706(a) and (b) as properly read 
in tandem.  In other words, for either to be an independent source of 
jurisdiction, the section 706(b) report must find that advanced 
telecommunications capability is not being deployed to all Americans 
in a reasonable and timely fashion.  Such a reading is consistent, for 
example, with the FCC’s own invocation of section 706 (not section 
706(a) independently) as background jurisdiction to its critically 
important Open Internet Order forbearance decisions.14 A few 
snippets of the FCC’s record to trigger its section 706 jurisdiction are 
described below.  
II. OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE FACT FINDING 
A. The Section 706 Report—Triggering 706 Jurisdiction 
 Given the importance of section 706 in the recent Open Internet 
Order,15 it is worthwhile to take a look at the evidentiary record behind 
it.  Reading section 706 holistically, to trigger its jurisdictional power, 
the FCC must show that (1) advanced telecommunication services are 
not being deployed in a timely and reasonable manner, and (2) its 
proposed regulation will “encourage the deployment . . . of advanced 
telecommunications capability,” arguably, by removing barriers to 
infrastructure investment and promoting competition.16  The first 
showing is found in the “INQUIRY” required by section 706(b)—the 
so-called section 706 report—and is discussed below in Part II (a).  
The second part of the FCC’s evidentiary record examined is the Open 
14 See, e.g., Order ¶ 495 (“We note in this regard that when exercising its section 10 
forbearance authority ‘[g]uided by section 706,’ the Commission permissibly may ‘decide[] 
to balance the future benefits’ of encouraging broadband deployment ‘against [the] short 
term impact’ from a grant of forbearance.”) (quoting EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC, 462 F.3d 1, 9 
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
15 The FCC, itself, asserts that the Title II provisions adopted in the Order are redundant 
given the Commission’s assertion of authority under section 706. Order ¶ 448; cf Order ¶ 
446. 
16 Section 706 (a) and (b) are viewed by some to give two separate, and, perhaps, mutually 
exclusive, lists of potential powers to the FCC.  The final legal interpretation of section 706 
is yet to be decided.  This essay assumes that the list of potential mechanisms of applying 
the authority includes those listed in both subsections (a) and (b). “[O]verlay of section 706 
of the [Telecommunications] Act and our desire to proceed incrementally” enable the 
Commission to forbear from large swaths of the Communications Act, including its 
economic regulations, without a finding of sufficient competition.”  Order ¶ 458. 
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Internet Order itself, which has questionable support for 
implementing the regulatory mechanisms described in section 706.  
 Therefore, the FCC can affect its own authority under section 706 
in one of two ways.  First, the FCC can toughen the definition of 
“advanced communications services” (make the standard higher than 
currently found in the market) so that it becomes tautological that 
such services are not being reasonably and timely deployed.17 
Specifically, because high speed broadband falls under that definition 
of “advanced communications services,” the grant of power under 
section 706 expands as the FCC discovers only lower speed broadband 
in the market place.  Likewise, the FCC has some leeway to find that 
advanced communications services are not being deployed in a 
“reasonable and timely manner” (emphasis added).  Therefore, if the 
FCC applies an unattainable yardstick to the statute’s malleable 
terminology, the FCC will have increased jurisdiction.  The FCC’s 
definitions, findings, and conclusions are then set forth in the section 
706 reports.   
 Yet again, in line with my original premise, to assure that the 
FCC’s decisions are not ultimately found “arbitrary and capricious,” 
there is only so much leeway the FCC should be given.  The FCC’s 
17 Compare Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to 
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398, ¶¶ 20-30 (1999) (defining broadband as services providing 
download and upload speeds in excess of 200 kilobits per second (“kbps”), and measuring 
“reasonable and timely” by evaluating actual or probable availability of broadband to all 
Americans “by considering the state of investment in broadband facilities, the extent to 
which last mile facilities have actually been deployed, deployment to ‘all Americans,’ and 
the state of demand”), with Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and 
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act; A 
National Broadband Plant for Our Future, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9558-60 (2010), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-129A1_Rcd.pdf (redefining 
broadband as services providing download speeds in excess of 4 Megabits per second 
(“Mbps”) and upload speeds in excess of 1 Mbps, and reevaluating “reasonable and timely” 
based on the new broadband definition, the current state of availability—rather than the 
rate of deployment—and rates of subscription) and Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of 
Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely 
Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 
GN No. 14-126, FCC, 3-4 (Feb. 4, 2015), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-10A1.pdf (redefining, yet again, 
broadband as services providing download speeds in excess of 25 Mbps and upload speeds 
in excess of 3 Mbps, and reevaluating “reasonable and timely” based on the new speed).  
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analysis cannot be so expansive or untethered to current accepted 
methodologies as to be mere conjecture.  Under the Administrative 
Procedures Act, the court “will set aside agency action that [fails to 
show that]… the agency has ‘examine[d] the relevant data and 
articulated[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 
rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.’”18  
The most recent section 706 report arguably skirts the mandate for a 
“rational connection between the facts found and the choices made” 
on both the definitions of advanced communication services and of 
what constitutes “reasonable and timely” deployment.   
 In its first five section 706 reports, the FCC found that the 
advanced communications service (as then defined) was growing at a 
reasonable and timely pace.19  Shortly before asserting additional net 
neutrality rules under the never-before-tested section 706 jurisdiction 
theory, the FCC suddenly determined that the high-speed broadband 
market was in trouble.20   
18 Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983)). 
19 Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such 
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 FCC Rcd. 
9615, 9616 (2008); Availability of Advanced Telecommunications Capability in the United 
States, GN No. 04-54, FCC 2 (Sept. 9, 2004) (Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-208A1.pdf; Inquiry Concerning 
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in Reasonable 
and Timely Fashion, Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 
706 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, 17 FCC Rcd. 2844, 2845 (2002); Inquiry 
Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans 
in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Rcd. 20913, 20914 
(2000); Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability 
to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate 
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 FCC 
Rcd. 2398, ¶ 7 (1999). 
20 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to 
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such 
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended 
by the Broadband Data Improvement Act: A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, 25 
FCC Rcd. 9556, 9557 (2010) (finding that deployment of broadband to all Americans is 
unreasonable and untimely); Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 
25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17968-72 (2010) (asserting on December 21, 2010, that section 706 
provides independent authority for the FCC to pass three net neutrality principles: (i) 
transparency, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) no unreasonable discrimination). 
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 The problems the FCC identified correlated in great part with the 
FCC’s redefinition of advanced communication services.  Arguably, 
the FCC found that, under the current definitions, there was 
reasonable and timely deployment of such services, so they decided to 
simply move the goal line.21  The redefinition of advanced 
communication services was based almost solely on speed.  Arguably, 
this is a highly linear and one-dimensional interpretation as many 
commentators have noted the importance of other characteristics such 
as latency and jitter.22  The speed at which a service was determined to 
be “advanced” was increased twentyfold for download speeds and 
fivefold for upload speeds.23  Suddenly, what had been advanced 
communication services one night was obsolete the next.  In addition, 
the FCC did not include mobile in its advanced communication 
 
 
 
 
21 Arguably, moving the goal line is occurring in the Eleventh Broadband Report as the FCC 
inserts new rules and tests.  See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and 
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 
2015 WL 4741030 at ¶ 8 (new condition that an area is unserved unless it has “both fixed 
and mobile broadband”); id. at ¶¶ 41–46 (new test for broadband “consistency”); id. at ¶¶ 
50–52 (qualifying objective test by listing “additional factors” the FCC will consider, such 
as “access to multiple service providers”).  No doubt, the nature of an industry changes and 
surveys of its progress must likewise adapt.  However, the problem with any change in the 
section 706 report is that it will affect the time series analysis of “progress” that is, 
arguably, called for in the report.  Again, this speaks to the need for more scrupulous fact 
finding (trying to control for these changes), as well as aggressive review by the courts. 
22 See Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation versus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality Is 
Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1680 (2011); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, 
Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional Perspective on the Net 
Neutrality Debate, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 31-32 (2008); Tim Wu, Network 
Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 148 (2003).  
23 The definition changed from 200 kbps/200 kbps to 4Mbps/1Mbps.  Inquiry Concerning 
the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a 
Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment 
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the 
Broadband Data Improvement Act: A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, GN Nos. 
09-137, 09-51, Sixth Broadband Deployment Report, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9559 (2010). That 
the definition should change from time to time (or, better yet, that data is gathered for 
several different speeds as well as latency, jitter rates, and other important quality 
demarcations) is not at issue here.  The timing, magnitude of change with limited data, and 
the lack of inclusion of mobile connectivity are what make a skeptical look at these changes 
appropriate.  See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d at 642 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The timing of the 
Commission’s determination is certainly suspicious, coming as it did closely on the heels of 
our rejection in Comcast of the legal theory on which the Commission had until then relied 
to establish its authority over broadband providers.”).  
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services calculus, even though some of those services would have met 
the new definition.  This of course exacerbated the finding that there 
were relatively few advanced communication services deployed.24 The 
determination was particularly odd given the FCC’s later finding in the 
Open Internet Order that mobile must be included in the definition of 
Internet Service Providers because of mobile’s central importance to 
the communications ecosystem.25 
 The FCC repeated this process in later reports, laying the 
groundwork for extensive regulation by drastically changing the 
definition of advanced communication services on the eve of adopting 
new rules.26  First, the FCC suddenly, and without consumer demand 
analysis (not even an examination of prices and willingness to pay for 
higher speeds), changed the definition of what constitutes advanced 
communication services.27  The new definition (again, concentrating 
 
 
 
 
24 See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to 
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such 
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended 
by the Broadband Data Improvement Act: In re A National Broadband Plan for Our 
Future, 25 FCC Rcd. 9556, 9696-97 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Meredith A. 
Baker) (“First, the [Sixth] Report focuses almost exclusively on terrestrial broadband 
options. Section 706 is not technology specific, yet [the Sixth] Report limits its findings to 
terrestrial solutions.”); see also id. at 9560 n.19 (concluding that 14 to 24 million 
Americans lack broadband accessibility based on the finding that 14 million people do not 
have access to terrestrial connectivity that meets the 4Mbps/1Mbps definition).    
25 Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17956 
¶¶ 93-95 (2010). 
26 Compare Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to 
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 27 FCC Rcd. 10342, 10403 
n.364 (concluding that 14 million Americans lack access to either fixed or mobile 
broadband by electing to ignore SBI mobile deployment data in Table 15—a finding that 
only 5.5 million Americans lack access to either fixed or mobile broadband—in favor of 
Mosaik mobile deployment data because the SBI data possibly over reports and includes 
technologies that do not meet the 4Mbps/1Mbps definition) with id. at 10383 ¶ 89 
(acknowledging that Mosaik Data may also overstate mobile deployment) and id. at 10383 
n.241 (admitting that Mosaik Data is flawed because Mosaik estimates deployment based 
on the type of technology, rather than the speed of the technology; the Commission has to 
infer speeds from the type of technology reported; and because various technologies 
included in Mosaik’s data may not meet the 4Mbps/1Mbps definition). 
27 See Inquiry Concerning the Development of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to 
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such 
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended 
by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 30 FCC Rcd. 1375, 18 ¶ 45 (Feb. 24, 2015). 
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on speeds only) was an advanced service that would provide 25 
Mbps/down and 5 Mbps/up.  Based on the dearth of market analysis, 
not only does this number appear random, it is also inconsistent with 
the FCC’s definition of high-speed broadband for its own rural subsidy 
program.28  Most recently, the FCC again set 10 Mbps broadband 
availability for the economically disadvantaged as a laudable 
accomplishment when it approved the AT&T merger with DirectTV.29  
It is difficult to square the two different standards—a 25 Mbps 
standard for broadband to trigger FCC jurisdiction and a 10 Mbps 
standard for rural and the underprivileged—as consistent with the 
requirements of even-handed fact finding. 30  
B. The Open Internet Order—Triggering 706 Action 
 The Open Internet Order is a long, involved rulemaking that 
makes many determinations to support its ultimate rules.  This essay 
examines only one grouping of economic determinations that 
exemplify the FCC’s problematic evidentiary record: the 
28 See Connect America Fund; ETC Annual Reports and Certifications; Petition of 
USTelecom for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) from Obsolete ILEC Regulatory 
Obligations that Inhibit Deployment of Next-Generation Networks, WC Nos. 10-90, 14-58, 
14-192; Report and Order, FCC 14-190 ¶¶ 15-16 (rel. Dec. 18, 2014) (CAF Phase II Order) 
(adopting a minimum speed requirement of 10 Mbps download and 1 Mbps upload for an 
order allocating billions of dollars to deploying broadband to rural and high-cost areas). 
This Report and Order was adopted only one month prior to the adoption of the tenth 
section 706 report, which defined advanced telecommunications services as 25/3 Mbps. 
See infra note 33. 
See also Inquiry Concerning the Development of Advanced Telecommunications Capability 
to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate 
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as 
Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, GN No. 14-126, FCC 111-13 (Feb. 4, 
2015) https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-10A1.pdf (Dissenting 
Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai). 
29 Applications of AT&T Inc. and DIRECTV For Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of 
Licenses and Authorizations, MB No. 14-90, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 15-94, 
Appendix B at Condition VI.2.a–b (July 28, 2015). 
30 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, amended by 
the Broadband Data Improvement Act (BDIA), Pub. L. No. 110-385, 122 Stat. 4096 (2008), 
codified in Title 47, Chapter 12 of the U.S. Code (Commission to collect data for 
“geographical areas that are not served by any provider of advanced telecommunications 
capability”)).   
56 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:1 
 
 
determinations made with respect to the No Paid Prioritization31 
rule—based largely on section 706(b) jurisdiction.32 
 Although there are many examples of questionable fact finding in 
the Open Internet Order,33 I find this to be an instructive example of 
the record’s fact-finding problems because the exercise of rulemaking 
jurisdiction in the Open Internet Order is dependent on the adequacy 
of fact finding in a distinct section 706 report.  How exactly should the 
court set its standard for review?  It could be that if each record-
building moment (the report and the rulemaking) is reviewed 
independently, each might be found sufficient to meet the highly 
deferential standard afforded an expert agency.  Given the unique 
“on/off” nature of section 706 jurisdiction, however, I would argue 
that the record should be viewed in its totality (the triggering report 
and the rulemaking order) to assure that flimsy, but acceptable, 
rulemaking is not built upon a flimsy, but acceptable, jurisdictional 
platform.   
 To build the record in a rulemaking is similar to the process by 
which the FCC builds the record for its reports. First, the FCC will set 
out a proposed rule, invite comments, and then decide, through its 
own studies or with reference to the comments, which conclusions to 
make and with which rules to proceed.  For this process, the Supreme 
Court has “insist[ed] that an agency examine the relevant data.”34  
Indeed, under review, “it most emphatically remains the duty of th[e] 
court to ensure that an agency engage the arguments raised before 
it.”35  In particular, an agency’s judgments about the “likely economic 
 
 
 
 
31 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, GN No. 14-28, FCC 15-24 (Feb. 26, 2015) 
No Paid Prioritization, Order ¶ 18. 
32 This issue was briefed extensively in Brief of International Center for Law & Economics 
and Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners United States Telecom Ass’n, et 
al. at 28-31; United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 23, 
2015) 2015 WL 4698404, at *29-*31. I am not associated with the brief, but I raise its 
arguments as an example of some of the red flags raised in the FCC’s Open Internet Order. 
33 For me, particularly poignant was the complete disregard of empirical evidence that Title 
II would have a negative impact on broadband investment. Already, it appears that the 
mere reclassification to Title II, regardless of the FCC’s forbearance, has started the 
anticipated decline in investment.  See Hal Singer, Does the Tumble in Broadband 
Investment Spell Doom for the FCC’s Open Internet Order?, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2015, 8:50 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/site/halsinger/2015/08/25/does-the-tumble-in-broadband-
investment-spell-doom-for-the-fccs-open-internet-order/.   
34 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
35 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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effects of a rule . . . must be based on some logic and evidence, not 
sheer speculation.”36   
 When the Commission lays out its No Paid Prioritization rule, it 
asserts that “[t]he record reflects the view that paid arrangements for 
priority . . . likely damage the open Internet, harming competition and 
consumer choice.”37  An examination of the comments cited as 
support for this principle is troubling.  There is evidence that 
comments have actually been  mischaracterized—cited for a principle 
they do not support—and contrary comments that contain rigorous 
economic study are completely disregarded in the record. 
 For example, the Commission cites to a comment by Sandvine for 
the principle that paid prioritization will harm consumers,38 but 
Sandvine’s comment actually argues for the exact opposite conclusion.  
The comment states that the Commission’s theory against paid 
prioritization—that it would lead to “fast” and “slow” lanes—is likely 
“technically unsound.”  Moreover, Sandvine characterizes paid 
prioritization as an “innovative service plan[]” that will likely 
“increase[] adoption of the Internet around the world, enhance[] 
competition, and give[] consumers more (and more affordable) 
choice.”39 
 As commenters have noted, more disturbing, still, is that the great 
deal of economic literature on the issue of paid prioritization (and 
other net neutrality proposals) was largely ignored.40  That literature 
consistently concludes that paid prioritization may have positive or 
negative effects on consumers, and that it is extremely difficult to 
determine those effects ex ante.41  This literature is not noted or 
36 Sorencoson Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
37 Order ¶ 103; see also Order ¶¶ 126, 127. 
38 Order ¶ 126 n.287. 
39 Promoting and Protecting the Open Internet, Comments of Sandvine, Inc., GN 14-28, at 
2; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of International Center for Law & Economics and 
Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners United States Telecom Ass’n, et al. 
at 29-30, United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 23, 2015) 
2015 WL 4698404, at *29.  
40 See Amicus Curiae Brief of International Center for Law & Economics and 
Administrative Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners United States Telecom Ass’n, et al., 
at 30, United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 23, 2015) 2015 
WL 4698404, at *30. 
41 Id. 
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engaged by the Commission.  Rather, as critiqued in court filings, the 
Commission relies on a supposedly “well-established body of 
economic literature,” which consists of four articles from the 1980s on 
price discrimination, one unpublished article, and a 2000 article that 
is barely relevant.42 
 Such bravado with regard to the facts and comments runs through 
other sections of the Open Internet Order.  This includes, most 
centrally, a dismal discussion of impact on infrastructure 
investment—a key component of section 706(b)—where the 
Commission relies heavily, if not exclusively, on comments from an 
advocacy group and hearsay, rather than empirical data.43  No doubt, 
these few examples and the totality of the factual infirmities point to 
an exercise of section 706 jurisdiction that fails to live up to 
Congress’s goals.  The FCC is making policy based on an insufficient 
record, which, at the very least, threatens to find its rules vacated and 
remanded.  
CONCLUSION 
 The Open Internet Order is a massive and, therefore, worthy event 
study of the important role of agency rulemaking.  In today’s modern 
administrative state, we ask much of our expert agencies, but we 
should demand much as well.  If an agency does not act in accordance 
with expert principles—if it is shown that the agency has not built its 
rulemaking upon consistent and respected methodologies of evidence 
gathering—then that agency should be forced to defend itself with 
greater vigor.  That is not to say that a rulemaking order with 
questionable data or evidence should automatically be voided, but, 
rather, that greater judicial scrutiny of a faulty evidentiary record will 
ultimately lead to better policy choices.     
42 Id.; see Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5655 n.296 
(2015). 
43 See citations to Free Press at Order ¶ 420.  The ignored findings have come quickly and, 
shockingly, true as infrastructure investment has plummeted since the Order was enacted. 
See also Hal Singer, Does the Tumble in Broadband Investment Spell Doom for the FCC’s 
Open Internet Order?, FORBES, Aug. 25, 2015, 
http://www.forbes.com/site/halsinger/2015/08/25/does-the-tumble-in-broadband-
investment-spell-doom-for-the-fccs-open-internet-order/.  
